Democratic Accountability within Legislative-Executive Interactions: A Case Study of Simultaneously Raising Premium and Deductible of Taiwan's NHI in 2002

• Main Authors: Feng-I Liao, 廖豐億
• Other Authors: Don-Yun Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/93544647057772237922

碩士 === 世新大學 === 行政管理學研究所(含博、碩專班) === 93 === In any democratic polity, policy outputs generated by government are deeply affected by mechanisms designed to guarantee democratic accountability. Under these mechanisms, we can make sure the government generates policy outputs according to the policy preference of the citizenry. Among them, the check and balance between the executive and legislative branches is the most prominent one. In this study, author uses the case of simultaneously raising NHI’s premium and deductible in 2002 to explore the democratic accountability between Legislative and Executive. Data is collected from the newspapers. Author in this study utilizes in-depth interviewing method to collect more qualitative data. By these two major methods, there are three findings in this research. First, Executive’s political autonomy is beyond legislature’s control. Second, the case gives some evidences of the “party abdication hypothesis” that legislature gives away its control over executive in a rational way. . Third, the interactions between Legislative and Executive branches are constrained by democratic accountability mechanism.