A study on financial assessment mode for BOT cooperation – A case study of T-9 Transfer Station of Taipei City

• Main Authors: Yih-Shun Jou, 周義順
• Other Authors: Sou-Sen Leu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/97857372273807554451

碩士 === 國立臺灣科技大學 === 營建工程系 === 93 === After promulgation and implementation in 2000, the “Law for Promotion of Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects” has become one of the main methods for the government to promote infrastructure projects under the circumstance of insufficient taxation and serious budgetary back-log. After survey, infrastructure constructed by the BOT method requires private enterprises to invest the most money and bear higher risks relatively. When the government assesses the practicability of a BOT, it happens that the data of financial assessment indicate feasibility but the actual investor attraction did not go smoothly. Therefore, the present method of “Cash Solvency Analysis” should be supported together with other methods. The cooperative game theory is employed in this study. The Nash Equilibrium is adopted to structure the “Financial assessment mode for cooperation between the government and private enterprises”. Based on the bottom line of private participation, provided that the government accomplishes infrastructure, the mode should identify a reasonable range of royalties, which gives a common language and platform for comparison to both parties to assess the financial practicability of BOT. And supporting mechanisms, such as negotiation and market competition, should be adopted together. It is expected to be helpful for the government to examine the financial assessment which is the preparation for BOT and to increase opportunities for successful contracts signed.