The Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility

• Main Authors: Cheng-Ling Yu, 游承霖
• Other Authors: 黃懿梅
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85717262835219133420

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 哲學研究所 === 93 === In this thesis I shall discuss Frankfurt and Fischer/Ravizza’s “Frankfurt-style counterexamples” to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and the principle of transfer of non-responsibility (Transfer NR). It is common among contemporary philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of arguments for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility: the indirect argument and the direct argument. The indirect argument relies upon PAP and the direct argument relies upon Transfer NR. However, PAP and Transfer NR have come under attacks. Frankfurt, in his influential paper, “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”, has questioned the plausibility of PAP; and Fischer and Ravizza have similarly questioned the validity of Transfer NR in Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility. The aim of this thesis is to defend PAP and Transfer NR from the so-called “Frankfurt-style counterexamples.” I shall argue that “Frankfurt-style counterexamples” fail to invalidate both PAP and Transfer NR. In my defense of PAP and Transfer NR, I shall rely upon a principle which I call “the principle of the ultimate source” (US). This thesis has three chapters. The first chapter deals with PAP, the indirect argument, Frankfurt’s attack on PAP and the responses to Frankfurt’s attack. The second chapter deals with Transfer NR, the direct argument, Fischer and Ravizza’s attack on Transfer NR and the responses to Fischer and Ravizza’s attack. In the responses to Frankfurt, Fischer and Ravizza’s attacks, besides presenting my own argument, I shall also discuss responses from some other philosophers. The last chapter is the conclusion.