| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 政治學研究所 === 93 === Taiwan’s “Defensive Referendum Clause” was first enacted in 2004, for representing the objection of Taiwan’s people to being threatened by PRC’s arbitrary and military orientations that always aim to “possess Taiwan”. It was a remarkable political development of Taiwan, despite its contentious nature being supposed to stir up two nationalisms embedded in the complex Taiwan’s political society and history to clash together, had created a potential chance for Taiwan to solve the problem of its historical ambiguous “statehood” disputes domestically, and perhaps internationally.
This thesis tries to answer two simple questions inherent in the former political progress of Taiwan, as “why would the two extremely different nationalisms holders in Taiwan, Pan-Blue and Pan-Green Party-Coalitions, decide to facilitate the policy process of Taiwan’s Defensive Referendum Clause?” and “What was the situation in which the two extremely different nationalisms holders in Taiwan, Pan-Blue and Pan-Green Party-Coalitions, decided to facilitate the policy process of Taiwan’s Defensive Referendum Clause?”. Instead of using the current classical policy process models as the analytical tools to work on these two questions, the author developed an alternative model emphasizing the dynamic relationship regularities of actors’ internal equilibrium and actors’ external equilibrium, the “Policy Mapping Model” to find out the answers. And in the conclusion, besides straightening out the answers of the two main questions, further policy prospects relevant to the development of Taiwan’s statehood policy agenda and the evaluation of “Policy Mapping Model” would be also illustrated by the author.
The reasearch shows, first, “the dissolve of the asymmetric power relationships determined by the policy problem itself ”,”the issue salience up-leveling”,and “the solution to the policy problem that could incorporate the different policy actors’ homogeneous belief coming out ” all-together might construct a “sudden time” of policy change, and policy change is just as the outcome of the policy actors’ internal equilibrium collapse with their external eqilibrium crash. Second, the spread of SARS from China in Taiwan, and other semi-structural factors as Taiwan’s 2002 legislative election outcome, China’s power transition process, Bush administration’s way of running up US.-Taiwan military relationship, Chen Shuei-Bian’s increasing power in Taiwan’s domestic politics,Taiwan people’s national consciousness changing, groups lobbyng, had ever affected this policy process.
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