INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 公共行政暨政策學系 === 93 === This study focuses on the interjurisdictional competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City in the policy of new international airport in south Taiwan. It reviews laws and regulations concering this issue to clarify who has the authority in the decision-...

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Main Authors: HSU, CHUN-WEI, 徐俊偉
Other Authors: CHANG, YU-CHE
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2005
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87951163910392054235
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spelling ndltd-TW-093NTPU06100022016-06-13T04:17:34Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87951163910392054235 INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN 我國地方經濟發展的府際競爭關係:以南部新國際機場為例 HSU, CHUN-WEI 徐俊偉 碩士 國立臺北大學 公共行政暨政策學系 93 This study focuses on the interjurisdictional competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City in the policy of new international airport in south Taiwan. It reviews laws and regulations concering this issue to clarify who has the authority in the decision-making of constructing this new international airport. Furthermore, it describes the interactions between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City during this process. This study reaches the following conclusions: First, economic development competitions between local governments may not lead to the efficient arrangement of social resources, and local governments may not obtain any relative advantages as a result of the competitions. Moreover, central government may waste extra resources in order to resolve problems caused by competitions between local governments. Second, in Taiwan, the power of local governments in promoting economiy is substantially constrained by the central government. Fiscal incentives used by local governments must be authorized by the central government. The most popular fiscal incentives include the abatements of Land Price Tax(地價稅), House Tax(房屋稅), and Contract Tax(契稅), capital financing assistance, and subsidies to loan interest. Third, according to Civil Aviation Act(民航法), local governments can run airports in Taiwan. However, they must apply to the central government for the construction of new airports. Besides, during the application process, they must comply with Environment Impact Evaluation Act(環境影響評估法), Land Act(土地法), and Land-Expropriating Act(土地徵收條例). In other words, they must submit environment impact statements to the central government, and apply to the central government for expropriating private land or authorizing other government-owned land. In short, local governments in Taiwan, cannot construct airports willfully. By constraining the authority of local governments in the construction of airports, it may avoid wasting resources due to the competitions between local governments. Finally, the extent of interjurisdictional competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City in the policy of new international airport in south Taiwan is influenced by the attitude of the central government. When the central government inclined to support Tainan County, it led to Kaohsiung City’s retort, and the competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City was intense. On the contrary, when the central government opposed Tainan County, it led to Tainan County’s retort. But Tainan County’s retort was against the central government, the competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City was actually weakened. When the central government consented to the construction of new international airport in south Taiwan and took the case into a formal procedure, the tension between the central government, Tainan County and Kaohsiung City were further relaxed. CHANG, YU-CHE 張育哲 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 161 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 公共行政暨政策學系 === 93 === This study focuses on the interjurisdictional competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City in the policy of new international airport in south Taiwan. It reviews laws and regulations concering this issue to clarify who has the authority in the decision-making of constructing this new international airport. Furthermore, it describes the interactions between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City during this process. This study reaches the following conclusions: First, economic development competitions between local governments may not lead to the efficient arrangement of social resources, and local governments may not obtain any relative advantages as a result of the competitions. Moreover, central government may waste extra resources in order to resolve problems caused by competitions between local governments. Second, in Taiwan, the power of local governments in promoting economiy is substantially constrained by the central government. Fiscal incentives used by local governments must be authorized by the central government. The most popular fiscal incentives include the abatements of Land Price Tax(地價稅), House Tax(房屋稅), and Contract Tax(契稅), capital financing assistance, and subsidies to loan interest. Third, according to Civil Aviation Act(民航法), local governments can run airports in Taiwan. However, they must apply to the central government for the construction of new airports. Besides, during the application process, they must comply with Environment Impact Evaluation Act(環境影響評估法), Land Act(土地法), and Land-Expropriating Act(土地徵收條例). In other words, they must submit environment impact statements to the central government, and apply to the central government for expropriating private land or authorizing other government-owned land. In short, local governments in Taiwan, cannot construct airports willfully. By constraining the authority of local governments in the construction of airports, it may avoid wasting resources due to the competitions between local governments. Finally, the extent of interjurisdictional competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City in the policy of new international airport in south Taiwan is influenced by the attitude of the central government. When the central government inclined to support Tainan County, it led to Kaohsiung City’s retort, and the competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City was intense. On the contrary, when the central government opposed Tainan County, it led to Tainan County’s retort. But Tainan County’s retort was against the central government, the competition between Tainan County and Kaohsiung City was actually weakened. When the central government consented to the construction of new international airport in south Taiwan and took the case into a formal procedure, the tension between the central government, Tainan County and Kaohsiung City were further relaxed.
author2 CHANG, YU-CHE
author_facet CHANG, YU-CHE
HSU, CHUN-WEI
徐俊偉
author HSU, CHUN-WEI
徐俊偉
spellingShingle HSU, CHUN-WEI
徐俊偉
INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
author_sort HSU, CHUN-WEI
title INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
title_short INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
title_full INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
title_fullStr INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
title_full_unstemmed INTERJURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION IN LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY:A CASE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH TAIWAN
title_sort interjurisdictional competition in local economic development policy:a case study of the international airport in south taiwan
publishDate 2005
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/87951163910392054235
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