Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods

碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 93 === Merger and collusion has become a popular and widespread activity between firms in the recent years. By doing this, firms can involve all the values which was created by their own factories to themselves. Manufacturers can not only raise their own profits but also...

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Main Authors: Wei-ru Zhao, 趙威儒
Other Authors: Shan-non Chin
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2005
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18137156803676317310
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spelling ndltd-TW-093NSYS53890342015-12-23T04:08:15Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18137156803676317310 Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods 垂直整合下廠商策略及中間財市場分析-以替代性與互補性最終財貨為例 Wei-ru Zhao 趙威儒 碩士 國立中山大學 經濟學研究所 93 Merger and collusion has become a popular and widespread activity between firms in the recent years. By doing this, firms can involve all the values which was created by their own factories to themselves. Manufacturers can not only raise their own profits but also diminish the uncertainty risk of purchasing middle material by vertical integrations. It has become a trend to integrate and collusion between firms. Vertical integrations bring more profits, but it also causes monopoly and forcing out. Vertical integrate can raise the market price, and it causes market foreclosure. As a result, the social welfare and the market competitive ability will be affected. General speaking, market foreclosure can be classified into full market foreclosure and partial market foreclosure according to the interrupting level to the middle material market. The manufactures use these two strategies to attain the highest profits. This article uses the Cournot model of oligopoly competition in successive market, and we use Cournot competition by different stages. We assumed the downstream as the price taker of middle material, and the price of final goods will be different according to the variety and substitution of the products. We figure out the appropriate final quantity and then reverse to the quantity and price of the upstream. We use Avenel and Barlet(2000) analyzing structure of successive market, and considering the most appropriate integrated forms between present and potential firms. Secondly, under a given strategy bundle, we analyze the influence between the final goods substitution and complementary to middle material market and social welfare. We found out the influence to middle material market by the choice of integrated strategy varied by substitution or complementary of final goods. Shan-non Chin 曾憲郎 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 45 zh-TW
collection NDLTD
language zh-TW
format Others
sources NDLTD
description 碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 93 === Merger and collusion has become a popular and widespread activity between firms in the recent years. By doing this, firms can involve all the values which was created by their own factories to themselves. Manufacturers can not only raise their own profits but also diminish the uncertainty risk of purchasing middle material by vertical integrations. It has become a trend to integrate and collusion between firms. Vertical integrations bring more profits, but it also causes monopoly and forcing out. Vertical integrate can raise the market price, and it causes market foreclosure. As a result, the social welfare and the market competitive ability will be affected. General speaking, market foreclosure can be classified into full market foreclosure and partial market foreclosure according to the interrupting level to the middle material market. The manufactures use these two strategies to attain the highest profits. This article uses the Cournot model of oligopoly competition in successive market, and we use Cournot competition by different stages. We assumed the downstream as the price taker of middle material, and the price of final goods will be different according to the variety and substitution of the products. We figure out the appropriate final quantity and then reverse to the quantity and price of the upstream. We use Avenel and Barlet(2000) analyzing structure of successive market, and considering the most appropriate integrated forms between present and potential firms. Secondly, under a given strategy bundle, we analyze the influence between the final goods substitution and complementary to middle material market and social welfare. We found out the influence to middle material market by the choice of integrated strategy varied by substitution or complementary of final goods.
author2 Shan-non Chin
author_facet Shan-non Chin
Wei-ru Zhao
趙威儒
author Wei-ru Zhao
趙威儒
spellingShingle Wei-ru Zhao
趙威儒
Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
author_sort Wei-ru Zhao
title Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
title_short Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
title_full Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
title_fullStr Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
title_full_unstemmed Vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
title_sort vertical integration strategies under substitional and complement final goods
publishDate 2005
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/18137156803676317310
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