Establishing the Principal-Agent Model for Public Service Pension Fund

• Main Authors: Cheng-Hisen Lin, 林政憲
• Other Authors: Ding-chou Cheng
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37664447680184082874

碩士 === 國防管理學院 === 資源管理研究所 === 93 === Public Service Pension Fund is one of important ways to developing high technology industry and impulsed the economy. The success of capital Fund had promoted the inversion of America. Developing Public Service Pension Fund has great influence on the transform of the model of economy growth. It is necessary to research how to design the principal-agent model of Public Service Pension Fund. If we find the most suitable machine-processed, we can lower the cost of Principal-Agent relationship. There are double Principal-Agent relationship in Public Service Pension Fund, so the Principal-Agent theory is suitable for research the game between Principal and Agent .Dissertation used Principal-Agent theory as a basic theory ,and to be based on the characteristics of Public Service Pension fund. Because the agent has more chance to take bribes and harm principal’s benefit. Dissertation modify the classical model, used new parameters in the utility function, set up the Principal-Agent model about Public Service Pension Fund. Dissertation discussed how to use Residual claim, which results in principal adverse selecting agent and agent’s moral hazard. Dissertation give advise about how to solve it.