The Danger of Fearless Shilling Strategy in Online Auction

• Main Authors: Kung Huo Wang, 王公叡
• Other Authors: Chiang Heien Kun
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57740399879148872953

碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 資訊管理學系所 === 93 === Online auctions offer a flexible and convenient way to trade with people all over the world without the limitation of regional market. The technology of internet also provides excellent communication for consumers located in different regions. They could conduct online auction with a mouse click and break the time and space barriers of traditional auctions. Unfortunately, the information asymmetric phenomenon in online auction is reverse than that of traditional auction because online auction allows sellers to keep anonymous. Bidders not only have to rely on sellers’product description but also have to compete with other unidentified bidders. Information uncertainty and information asymmetry deteriorate the trust of transactions in online auction. Online auction implicitly encourages opportunistic behavior to seller because shilling detection is hard and degree of punishment is light. This thesis introduced the unique trick of applying shilling strategy. Crafted shilling sellers hide their identity and pretend to be fearless bidders to earn the surplus profit from real bidders. This thesis analyzed and demonstrated English auctions with fearless sellers’ shilling strategy drove a higher expected seller profit than common English auctions. Taking into account the factors of “the amount of items added by sellers” and “canceled bid(s) from bidder”, this thesis gave evidence of fearless sellers’shilling behaviors and then showed patterns leading to these behaviors in the online auction environment.