A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms
碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 商業教育學系 === 93 === Abstract The study examines the relationship between monitoring mechanisms and fund manager’s behaviors, and investigates whether monitoring mechanisms constraint manager’s behavior. In addition, we examine the effect of monitoring mechanisms on fund’s performan...
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ndltd-TW-093NCUE53160352016-06-03T04:13:55Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77170806679567043449 A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms 共同基金經理人投資行為與監督機制之探討 許川原 碩士 國立彰化師範大學 商業教育學系 93 Abstract The study examines the relationship between monitoring mechanisms and fund manager’s behaviors, and investigates whether monitoring mechanisms constraint manager’s behavior. In addition, we examine the effect of monitoring mechanisms on fund’s performance. We use Taiwan open-ended funds from 1997-2003 as the sample. The result shows that, (I) direct monitoring and peer monitoring decrease fund’s turnover, (II) direct monitoring and product market monitoring decrease manager’s high risk adjusted behavior, (III) there is a positive relationship between fund’s performance and turnover ratio, and when managers adjust fund’s risk to a higher level, the fund has better performance. (IV) strong monitoring mechanisms are related to poor fund performance. Key words: monitoring mechanisms、fund manager’s behavior、fund turnover、risk adjusted behavior 林淑惠 2005 學位論文 ; thesis 87 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 國立彰化師範大學 === 商業教育學系 === 93 === Abstract
The study examines the relationship between monitoring mechanisms and fund manager’s behaviors, and investigates whether monitoring mechanisms constraint manager’s behavior. In addition, we examine the effect of monitoring mechanisms on fund’s performance. We use Taiwan open-ended funds from 1997-2003 as the sample.
The result shows that, (I) direct monitoring and peer monitoring decrease fund’s turnover, (II) direct monitoring and product market monitoring decrease manager’s high risk adjusted behavior, (III) there is a positive relationship between fund’s performance and turnover ratio, and when managers adjust fund’s risk to a higher level, the fund has better performance. (IV) strong monitoring mechanisms are related to poor fund performance.
Key words: monitoring mechanisms、fund manager’s behavior、fund turnover、risk adjusted behavior
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林淑惠 |
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林淑惠 許川原 |
author |
許川原 |
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許川原 A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
author_sort |
許川原 |
title |
A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
title_short |
A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
title_full |
A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
title_fullStr |
A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
title_full_unstemmed |
A Study of the Relationship between Mutual Fund Manager's Investment Behavior and Governance Mechanisms |
title_sort |
study of the relationship between mutual fund manager's investment behavior and governance mechanisms |
publishDate |
2005 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77170806679567043449 |
work_keys_str_mv |
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