A Trichotomy Reaction Attack on McEliece Public-Key Cryptosystem

• Main Authors: Han-Chang Liang, 梁漢璋
• Other Authors: Rong-Jaye Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60795171586417231621

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 資訊工程系所 === 93 === McEliece public-key cryptosystem is the first system combining cryptography and algebraic coding theory. In 1999, Hall et al. introduced the reaction attack on McEliece's and two other cryptosystems. Compared with chosen-ciphertext attacks, the reaction attack has higher feasibility. However, it requires more queries. In this thesis, we propose a trichotomy reaction oracle model. In this model, the key-owner is assumed that when a illegal ciphertext is received, he determines if the ciphtext is still decryptable and the plaintext is correct, then replies two different warning responses according to the judgement. And he replies an acknowledgement response when a legal ciphertext is received. We prove that if there is an algorithm which solves the comparative counterfeit coins problem, then there is an attack algorithm on the improper implementation which matches the trichotomy reaction oracle model. Furthermore, we design an efficient algorithm to solve the comparative counterfeit coins problem. Combined with the previous conclusion, a trichotomy reaction attack algorithm with fewer queries requirement is induced.