Bilateral Contract and Uncertainty in a Matching Market
碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 93 === I investigate the effects of matching probability and production-side uncertainty on output and contracting in this paper. The model consists of two types of agents, identified by their ownership of two types of indivisible assets. Firms must be paired via a match...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2005
|
| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/32paaz |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 經濟學系 === 93 === I investigate the effects of matching probability and production-side uncertainty on output and contracting in this paper. The model consists of two types of agents, identified by their ownership of two types of indivisible assets. Firms must be paired via a matching process in order to form productive relationships involving long-term investments and ongoing effort. I show that when future expected return increases, the government can reduce the matching probability in order to induce the maximum gross return. Depending on the profit prospect, a firm is allowed to choose between a robust contract and fragile contract. The opportunity cost for investment and matching probability will affect its choice of contract. This paper also illustrates that when there is no uncertainty in output level, firms will choose robust contracts.
|
|---|