The Political Economy of the Fiscal Relations among the Central and Variant Local Governments in Taiwan, 1946-2004

• Main Authors: Chen Huei Yi, 陳惠誼
• Other Authors: Jo-Yu Wu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37849124907469969436

碩士 === 國立暨南國際大學 === 公共行政與政策學系 === 93 === The perennial dilemma of local government is financial subjugation and self-autonomy. It has to depend on debt, so each government had cumulated more debts. The central government design system of financial distribution and subsidies for resolving local government’s subjugation and self-autonomy. These systems are concerned with huge political and economical benefits, when they want to modify or correct these system, they always bring about dispute and conflict. Why had the central and local government’s fiscal relation structured today’s condition? How did the behaviors by way of endowments continue to mobilize of bias? How does the intention of central government handle the change of these systems? We want to analysis the development of financial distribution and subsidies system, where’s the opaque and control of these systems? We have to provide directions of improvement. The current study employs a literature reviews, compare analysis and an-depth interview process. We used the political variables of party, renew term of office, has been councilor, to be suspected, earn the ballot ratio of magistrates and mayors. We want to analysis how the behaviors had used the bias to earn the resources? Observe development of these systems for a longtime. Then, we will know the complete picture of subsides and distribution systems. Major findings are summarized here. First, although the system correct many times, the local government’s fiscal still insufficient, the reason is the whole taxation insufficient and central government attain the great part of taxation. To guarantee The Taipei and Kaoshiung city‘s revenue constant was the modified principle, so local government’s distribution still was not balance. Second, Tax redistribution fund allocation of province 10%’s allocation with party of magistrates & mayors & chief of town to present positive correlation. But part of fixed ratio allocation is not correlation with political variables. The project grants were allocation to present positive correlation after and before political party transform.Third, The block grant’s allocation had not present correlation with political variables, but central government can usually use the change of term or weight or formula to changed allocation’s amount. The results of performance apprise can control easily. The following are summarized suggestions: Expand the tax base or modified tax system to resolve insufficient, restructure fair formula of distribution system, expenditure scale control, efficiency promotion of expenditure, restructure civil common view and civil society.