| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 東亞研究所 === 93 === The central question of this thesis is: Is China an expansionist or a self-preserving state in the Post-Cold War era? From defensive realism theory, I infer status quo policy, deterrence strategy, and costly signal to estimate Post-Cold War PRC security behavior. Empirically, I examine Chinese leaders’ statements, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-96, and South China Sea disputes in the Post-Cold War era. I reach the conclusion that: First, PRC’s perception of international environment is consistent with defensive realism’s argument that international structure is benign and security is plentiful. Second, China engages status quo foreign policy to maintain the international order. Third, China’s defense policy emphasizes on deterrence strategy to avoid direct conflict with the enemy. Fourth, China adopted costly signals to unfold its defensive, status quo, or cooperative intention to prevent other countries’ misunderstanding. I argue that, therefore, Post-Cold War China is a self-protecting state with the defensive security policy.
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