資產證券化對臺灣銀行業放款之影響

• Main Authors: Hou,Li-Yang, 侯立洋
• Other Authors: Huang,Jr-Tsung
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2005
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73014162012422123943

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 行政管理碩士學程 === 93 === The entire securitization market has been evolving rapidly since the first asset securitization product was issued in Taiwan in 2003. In the foreseeable future, asset securitization in Taiwan will become prevalent. However, there seems to be a substitution relationship between direct finance and indirect finance; that is, financial disintermediation may emerge as a result of asset securitization. Therefore, this paper aims to discuss the effects of asset securitization on bank loans in Taiwan. Based on the unbalanced panel data of the asset securitization of banks in Taiwan from Q4 2001 to Q4 2004 along with the estimates from the fixed-effects model, it is found in this study that, judging from Taiwan’s brief experience in asset securitization, an increase in asset securitization does indeed bring about a relative decline in the amount of loans (a decreased ratio of loan balance in assets). In other words, financial disintermediation has arisen with asset securitization in Taiwan. From a long-term perspective, increment of direct finance (including asset securitization) will lead to retarded growth in bank loans as well as a lower ratio of loan balance in assets. This, however, may not necessarily imply that the popularization of asset securitization would result in a decrease in the amount of bank loans or weaken the financial intermediation function of the banking system. In addition, effects of other factors on bank loans found via the fixed-effect model are as follows: (1) Non-performing loan (NPL) ratio and bank loans have an inverse relationship, albeit insignificant. This means that banks do not usually adjust the ratio of loan balance in assets in accordance with their NPL ratios. (2) The relationship between the net worth of banks and the amount of loans is insignificant as well. This indicates that the amount of loans would only rise with other assets as the net worth of banks increases; the ratio of loan balance in assets will not be specifically elevated. (3) The coefficient of Housing Price Index is significantly positive, indicating that the higher value a collateral has, the more a bank is willing to release a loan. (4) The coefficient of other stock of the direct finance (excluding asset securitization) is significantly negative, which reveals an obvious substitution relationship between direct finance and indirect finance. (5) The relationship between gross domestic product (GDP) and bank loans is insignificant, which indicates that the amount of bank loans would only rise with other bank assets as GDP increases; the ratio of loan balance in assets will not be elevated accordingly. As other explanatory variables are under control, the results gained from computing the specific effects (the ratio of loan balance in assets) of each sample (bank) show that only those with a higher ratio of loan balance in assets are found gradually reducing the radio. Such a trend is not found in others. Consequently, it can be inferred that the ratio of loan balance in assets depends on the business strategy of the bank itself, which results in different levels of the ratios among different banks.