| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 外交研究所 === 93 === This thesis addresses an issue regarding the US Government’s identification of the Chinese role as well as the bilateral relations between the two states during the past sixteen years ever since the end of the Cold War. It deals specifically with the following question: why the US administrations since 1989 have shuttled their identification of China between a strategic partner and strategic competitor? It firstly argues that rationalism, as conventionally an explanatory tool in IR, proves insufficient to provide a set of consistent answer. Unsatisfied, this thesis continues its argument that the question brought forth at the beginning can be effectively resolved, or interpreted, by constructivism, despite the constructivist rationale may not necessarily render rational choice model utterly invalid in this case.
Structurally speaking, Chapter One gives a brief with respect to the whole thematic structure inclusive of purpose of the study mentioned above and research limitations. Chapter Two demonstrates an effort of descriptive study as a set of background information by sketching out different phases of identification about relations with China that have been harbored by successive US administrations from President Bush Sr., Clinton to Bush Jr..
Chapter Three can be seen as an account of this thesis’ trying effort to explore the question per se from the rationalist perspective. The findings in Chapter Three are as follows: Neo-realism fails to explain why the US, premised upon concern of relative gains, would have cooperation with China. Neo-liberal institutionalism, following the logic of maximization of absolute gains, is inconsistent with an answer to the question of why the US would not given in on the issues of human rights and trade deficits. The above findings are suggestive. They open up the need for this thesis to observe the Sino-US diplomatic interactions from a social perspective in IR, i.e., constructivism.
Chapter Four ushers in main points of constructivism. Two arguments are therefore in order. First, it gives a justification for the choice of the mainstream of constructivism in IR advanced by Alexander Wendt. Second, to suit the purpose of this research, it funnels the ontological, epistemological, methodological arguments, world views raised by the constructivist school and thrashes out two reference points—world power structure and ideation—for further observations.
Chapter Five brings up the main body of the argument. It argues that a series of ideas such as A Fan-mode Strategic Concept in Asia Pacific, Multi-layer United Front, Neo-conservatism and Defensive Realism have been influential on the US identification of the relations with China. They in turn strike an image of Sino-US bilateral relations reflective of three kinds of culture distinguished by constructivists. In Hobbes’ terms, China can be seen as a strategic competitor. In Kant’s, China is a strategic partner. In Locke’s, the US is engaged but remains sceptical.
Chapter Six is the concluding part. It goes beyond the phenomena and moves into the theoretical realm by arguing that, although constructivism offers a broader analytic platform, rationalism and constructivism need not be exclusive. That much room for integration of the two paradigms becomes one of the recommendations for further researches.
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