| Summary: | 碩士 === 銘傳大學 === 管理研究所碩士在職專班 === 93 === This research is to discuss the management on affiliates by the parent company from the point of view of corporate governance, especially on the issues of agent problem, information asymmetrical, transparency, and board functions. The powerful management mechanism may decrease the investment risk and increse the investment performance. This research conduct a case study for deeply analysis and find valuable proposition for the management of subsiliaries and affiliates, especially for the the role and responsibility between parent company and affiliates, supervision mechanism on affiliates, operation mechanism of board on corporate governance, internal control and internal audit mechanism.
To compare the existing management system with best practice from related literature, the research propose a ideal framework for subsidiary and affiliate management. Then, to distinctive 4 groups by hi-low operational risk and performance and compare the execution of management system for verifying the valuation of proposed framework.
The conclusions are as follows.
1. The parent company shall have strict supervision and control on its affiliates to expand its business and reach the development target via its affiliates.
2. The development of the supervision mechanism on affiliates shall be valued according to the total resources and ability of the group, to design the role and responsibility of the parent company and its affiliates, and to design the supervision mechanism and execution procedures between the parent company and its affiliates.
3. The execution of the supervision mechanism on affiliates shall be initiated by the parent company, and the parent company shall assist its affiliates to execute and practice self-audit mechanism thoroughly.
4. The supervision mechanism on affiliates shall be cored on input, behavior and output control these three constructions, and dependant on the parent company or its affiliates as execution key man of supervision mechanism to develop proper supervision mechanism.
5. Affiliates of different structures of profit and risk shall base on different supervision mechanism, high profit and high risk shall take “performance-target supervision mechanism”; low profit and high risk shall base on “behavior-target supervision mechanism”. Low profit and low risk, which belongs to the parent company’s internal expansion, shall take “result-toward supervision mechanism”.
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