| Summary: | 碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 資訊管理系碩士班 === 93 === On the Internet, the bilateral bargaining agents will often fall into failure or cause poor utility value at the end of bargaining under time constraints and with incomplete information. The core of bargaining activities is the bargaining strategies of both agents. In this thesis, we analyse the offering sequence of bargaining protocol and propose four dynamic bargaining algorithms with novel and simple characteristics to make offers. Give an example, if seller makes offer firstly, in the view of buyer, the algorithm will predict the seller’s possible offers for the consecutive rounds with little information about seller’s deadline, reservation price, and bargaining strategy. Then, it revises buyer’s offer function to maximize its utility in one possible agreement point. The experimental results for the four algorithms show that the algorithms will enhance the ratio of reaching agreement and the utility value at the end of the bargaining.
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