| Summary: | 碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 93 === Proxy solicitation is the most often used means to obtain corporate control in Taiwan. It is for this reason that proxy solicitation constructs the subject of the present study. The present study utilizes 886 proxy solicitation associated with listed-companies on Taiwan Securities Exchange（TAIEX）during 1994-2004 to re-examine the impact of proxy solicitation on shareholders’ wealth by use of both market-adjusted and non-market-adjusted methods. Following Gili Yen（1992）, the present study adopts listed companies without proxy solicitation as the control group.
The major empirical findings are as follows：First, when compared with listed companies without proxy solicitation, it is found that the proxy solicitation is not beneficial to shareholders. Second, based on matched-group comparison taking into account the outcomes of the board re-election, the empirical findings arising from two estimation methods are different. Third, whether the capital market can effectively anticipate the outcomes of board reelection, the evidence is also inconclusive. Based on the about reported somewhat unexpected findings, some further studies are called for.
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