| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 東南亞研究所 === 92 === Trade liberalization and regional economic development have been the two major cores in the international economic relationship. World Trade Organization (WTO) of 1995 which substituted for The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) of 1947 make it sure to maintain the game rule of world trade liberalization and the goal of contributing to trade liberalization. Nevertheless, member states in WTO adopt multilateral negotiation in order to achieve the eliminating of every items of tariff on import/export goods. The way not only spends a lot of time but results ineffectively. Hence, all member states tend to integrate regional economics to secure their own economic benefit and enhance respective trade power by singing trade agreements. In addition, non-member states afraid of being marginalized under the trend of Regional Economic Integration and actively achieve Free Trade Agreement. The dissertation discusses whether “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area” is capable of operating well under the new trend of East Asian regional integration by analyzing experience of both NAFTA and EU.
The conclusion stated within this thesis is: Firstly, beside internal structurality of ASEAN in suspense and urgency, the deviation of economic reality between China and ASEAN member states, willingness and ability of lifting non-tariff question between ASEAN member states, divergent attitude among ASEAN member states toward China all would provide the possible impact on operating of “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area”. Secondly, “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area” doesn’t yet established until 2015, but two great economics, US and Japan, already attempted free trade agreement with Asian states and finished some agreements. At that time, how “ASEAN-China Free Trade Area will lead economic integration of East Asian Area. Thirdly, Form the political and economic result, above-mentioned impacts all would place an impasse on the development of the free trade Area in the face of various challenges and China’s “Soft Landing” policy.
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