| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 經濟學系應用經濟學碩士班 === 92 === With economic development, the issues of environment protection became more and more important to the public. In regard to the economic decision of location of public facilities with negative externality, it was usually claim to be determined by collective choice. In this paper, the purpose is to investigate the optimal location of noxious facilities under different policies chosen by the government.
It differs from economic literature that we consider firm’s input decision. In our two-stage analysis under Lösch competition, the first stage is to find the optimal location, and the second stage is choosing the firm’s optimal inputs given the optimal location.
According to the result, we find the raise of revenue makes the invested inputs increasing, the raise of cost makes the invested inputs decreasing, and the effect of market area to invested inputs is indeterminable unless additional condition is set. Moreover, the appearance of economies of scale enlarges the market area of noxious facility, and the increasing of population density or the rate of transport cost reduces the optimal market area.
The efficient solutions can then be compared with collective choice outcomes, we find that the solutions of voting with majority rule result too few noxious facilities, which are too large, spaced too far apart and produce the same level of output.
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