| Summary: | 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所 === 92 === On April 17th, 1961, John Kennedy’s government launched a secret operation at the Bay of Pigs, planned by the CIA and executed by the Cuban exiles, in the attempt to overthrow Cuban President Fidel Castro. Hoping to waltz into Cuba unchallenged, the invasion troops instead were overwhelmed by Castro’s forces immediately within 72 hours. The failure of the Bay of Pigs not only revealed U.S. involvement in the invasion, it also tightened Castro’s ties to the Soviet Union.
By applying Graham G. Allison’s three foreign policy decision-making models, this thesis examines the interaction between the main decision- makers, the decision -making process as well as the considerations of the Kennedy administration. The decision-makers involved acted on the consensus that Castro had to be removed, but disagreed over timing and measures. This thesis discovered that although the production of a foreign policy involves different organizations and participants, President Kennedy’s personal bias and leadership style played key roles in shaping the decision to invade Cuba, and caused him to dismiss both the State Department ‘s time-taking solution and the Defense Department’s open invasion plan, as well as ignore the National Security Council, which was designed to offer streamlined advice to the President. His request for a quiet, covert operation to bring down Castro and his personal relationship with the leadership of the highly-prestigious CIA helped the Bay of Pigs invasion plan to win over the case.
The Bay of Pigs invasion remains the classic example of what can happen when a president, led primarily by personal conviction, ignores the warning signals and proceeds with a disastrous foreign policy.
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