| Summary: | 碩士 === 東海大學 === 管理碩士學程在職進修專班 === 92 === This study attempts to explore the safeguarding effects of trasaction-specific investments within the context of international subcontracting partnership from a supplier''s perspective. Specially, the study aims to answer how the suppliers deploy the appropriate control mechanism to inhibit opportunistic behavior or induce behaviors that promote the continuance of a relationship.
From the empirical examination, we have found that the potential value of committing trasaction-specific investments by the supplier could be realized through inducing three possible governance mechanisms -- Relational Capital, Joint Decision Making and Quasi-Integration. The governance mechanism can therefore render the effects of safeguarding the transaction-specific investments(TSIs) for the supplier. At the same time, we have observing the consequence exerted by the safeguarding control mechanism on the trasaction-specific investments. Respectively, "Relational Capital" can be used as the safeguard on TSIs to bring the consequence of diminishing the supplier''s perceived risk, whereas "Joint Decision-Making" and "Quasi Integration" can be regarding as the safeguard on TSIs to result the consequence of enhancing the buyer''s dependence.
In other words, the pledge of supplier commitment through specialized investments such as dedicated equipment, people, knowledge and processes effectively changes the buyer-supplier relationship from being asymmetric dependent to mutually dependent. We therefore suggest the suppliers can proactively set up transaction-specific investments with the buyers; such investments would not only signal the supplier''s commitments to maintain an enduring relationship, but also facilitate moer engagement of relational capital, joint decision-making and quasi integration with the buyers.
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