Corporate Governance and Dividend Policy

• Main Authors: Hsiang-Shih Hung, 洪翔詩
• Other Authors: 李存修
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60436432776121469019

碩士 === 國立臺灣大學 === 財務金融學研究所 === 92 === This paper tests two models of dividends in Taiwan during the period of 2000-2002. And the empirical results in Taiwan support the expropriation hypothesis which argues that dividends signal the severity of the conflict between controlling and small shareholder. That is firms with weak corporate governance are associated with fewer cash dividend paying. However, the expropriation phenomenon is not such obvious gauged by deviations from control rights to cash flow rights. But if we replace deviations from control rights to cash flow rights with deviations from the percentage of board seats controlling shareholders occupy to cash flow rights, the expropriation by not paying dividends to shareholders becomes significant. This variable is proven to be more representative of conflicting interests between minority and majority shareholders in our regressions and proves controlling shareholders will exert their power in the board of directors to affect corporate dividend policy.