| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立臺灣海洋大學 === 資訊工程學系 === 92 === With the popularization of the computer network, commercial auction will enter the era of electronization too. Different from traditional bidding mechanisms, electronic bidding is convenient, but a direct implementation of bidding mechanisms electronically is full of tricky problems. For example, the submitted bids are very likely subjected to illegal tampering and eavesdropping. The bidder’s identity might not be authenticated thoughly. There may cause the result of the electronic bidding unfair and either to the bidder or the auctioneer. In 1969, Vickrey proposed an ideal auction mechanism, called the second price auction, which promotes each bidder bids according to his true utility value. Therefore, the bid of each bidder must be kept completely secret while using this kind of auction mechanism. Bidders are not allowed to learn other competitors’ bidding prices. In the design of the electronic version of this auction mechanism, bids are encrypted and should never be disclosed even in the bid opening phase or after that. All the bids need to be proved in a publicly verifiable way. Besides pursuing the security property, an electronic bidding mechanism must also give consideration to efficiency and fault-tolerant abilities, In this thesis, we compare several electronic bidding mechanisms and propose a secure (M +1)-st price auction protocol. This protocol is built on an electronic bulletin board system. The bids ciphertexts are designed according to the homomorphic property of the ElGamal encryption system such that the winner and the winning price can be determined highest decrypting each individual bids. Through a set of zero knowledge proofs, the correctness of all bids can be assumed efficiently, and a secure, fair electronic auction mechanism is constructed.
Keywords : second price auction, electronic bulletin board system, zero knowledge proof, homomorphism, ElGamal encryption.
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