Efficient Wage-Employment Bargaining, Perfect Capital Mobility and the Policy Assignment Principle
碩士 === 國立中山大學 === 經濟學研究所 === 92 === Following Chang, Lai, and Chang(1999), this report discusses the policy assignment problem with efficient wage-employment bargaining under perfect capital mobility. Whether it can rescue the default of proposed by Ramirez (1988) that coordinate between fiscal and...
Main Authors: | Hsiu-yin Chen, 陳秀英 |
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Other Authors: | Wen-ya Chang |
Format: | Others |
Language: | zh-TW |
Published: |
2004
|
Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06767519001652474823 |
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