| Summary: | 碩士 === 國防管理學院 === 國防決策科學研究所 === 92 === Since 1975, Taiwan Armed Forces have carried out the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) for over thirty years. The devise of such a program is to unite mid-term defense program with both the long-term military strategies and the short-term budgets to form an integrated management system. Yet, there have been some gaps between the intention and the realty of the system. Via analyzing PPBS phrases based on the original background, this study intends to locate the crevices and to offset the deficiencies of national defense resources management.
By referring to the US practical experiences the Strategy-To-Task framework, we will scrutinize the PPBS processes for those rifts. This study has shown that major rifts exist in-between some of the key linkages such as “national security strategy” vs. “military strategy”, “10-year arms-building conception” vs. “5-year force-restructuring plan”, “5-year force-restructuring plan” vs. “defense program”, “defense program” vs. “budgets”, and “budgets execution” vs. “feedback”. Reasons for the above rifts could be concluded as the following: the incapacity of the system to manifest the national security strategy, the deficiencies of the program structure, and the insufficiency of the data feedback mechanism.
By examining both the US and R.O.C PPBS historical documents and combining with the current practices, this study has provided some concrete suggestions for improvement, hence, it could enhance the armed forces performing capability and help it to create prominent values.
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