| Summary: | 博士 === 國立交通大學 === 管理科學系所 === 92 === Based on the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), how managerial ownership structure affects firm performance in Taiwan is explored in this study. Prior studies have mostly focused on the financial performance measures and have never taken the composition of managerial ownership into account. In this study, insiders (the broad definition of management) have been classified into executives, board members and large shareholders according to a hierarchy of asymmetric information. This study also examines the relation between managerial ownership and firm performance from three perspectives, i.e. financial measures (Tobin’s Q and return on assets), economic measures (technical efficiency and total factor productivity), and IPO survival duration.
Panel data of Taiwanese listed firms from different industries are employed in this study, and the electronics industry is closely examined in particular. It is observed that over the study period the total insider holding ratio remains steady while the executive holding ratio has increased significantly. As to the impact on firm performance, the results of total insider ownership on performance measures are still mixed and contradictory. However, critical resolutions are unveiled after managerial ownership is decomposed. Evidence shows that executive ownership has positive and consistent influences on Tobin’s Q, ROA as well as IPO survivability, and improves efficiency and productivity for the electronics industry. On the other hand, board ownership might not contribute to firm performance at all. Implication is that stock ownership of top officers in Taiwanese firms, especially for the high-tech sector, should be encouraged to enhance overall firm performance.
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