Trade-off Relations Between Trade Order and Autonomy of Customs Policy Under Global Governance：Arguments on the WTO’s Tariff Policies and Regulations

• Main Authors: Jau-Ming Wang, 王昭銘
• Other Authors: Tingji Lin
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/46786866880013666210

碩士 === 逢甲大學 === 公共政策所 === 92 === This thesis draws upon William Dunn’s “Policy Argue Model” to investigate topics of global governance. More specifically, it addresses the trade-offs between trade order and customs policy autonomy in the republic of China (R.O.C.). Constructive analysis of the situation prompted further inquiry into the linkages between the R.O.C.’s national customs policies and the World trade organization’s(WTO) trade regulations. From one perspective, border issues and taxation policies can be seen as important factors in determining a nation’s sovereignty. Correspondingly, the R.O.C.’s customs policies can significantly influence their national autonomy. However, under global governance, the WTO has established and imposed its own set of trade conditionalities upon countries like the R.O.C. Under pressures to compromise with trade regulations while simultaneously addressing domestic concerns, the R.O.C.’s national policy autonomy seems to be weakened by WTO influences. This thesis also looks at the trade-offs between trade order and customs policy autonomy from another perspective. The WTO’s policy control is primarily aimed at a world trade order maintained by important factors such as the simultaneous achievement of multiple side negotiations and a systematic way to manage, review and dispute settlement viewpoints. Using the Economic Analysis of Law’s principle, we analyzed the WTO’s policies and regulations and found that there were several economic benefits associated with the successful implementation of trade order. Bebefits such as wealth maximization, equal opportunities, decreasing transaction costs, etc., increase the R.O.C.’s economic efficiency and consequently benefit both producers and consumers alike. With careful preparation and organized implementation, the WTO’s trade policies would ultimately provide economic stability for the R.O.C.by minimizing future trade disputes. When implementing the WTO system, one would expect to construct trade order in the establishment of global governance; yet the legal system does not always encompass all trade situations within a country. While WTO conditionalities may negatively affect a weaker country’s policy autonomy in the short-run, it actually positively benefits the economy in a long-run analysis and thus can be viewed as a suitable form of global governance. During the contructions of this thesis, the framework for several inquiries were thus established: 1) How to determine the extent and degree of power and autonomy granted to customs agents. 2) How to address the issues of a bureaucratic customs system. 3) How to control the problem of smuggling in a free trade environment. 4) How to properly adjust the border tax system. Finally, This thesis attempts to establish a vision for the future. Although some issues regarding this topic were left out of this specific research process, the issues included were significant in their connection to present and near-future economic developments (i.e. antidumping duty, taxing in the electronics commerce industry, etc.).