The Effect of Auditor Changes and Family-Controlled Firms on Financial Report Lag

• Main Authors: Tzu-ling Jan, 詹紫伶
• Other Authors: Hung-Shu Fan
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92460408724788299615

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 會計所 === 92 === We might expect an increase in audit report lag with a new client-auditor relationship because of the start-up time necessary for a new auditor to become familiar with client records, operations, internal controls and the prior periods’ working papers (DeAngelo, 1981). In Taiwan, the audit report is signed by the CPA, which is different from by the CPA firm in US. Therefore, we hypothesize the firms that change their CPA firm or CPA in the fiscal year may have longer financial report lags. Because of the audit conflicts, an auditor needs to negotiate with his clients. This research adopts the concept of ultimate controlling shareholders used by La Porta et al. (1999) to analyze how the firm’s ownership structure influences his financial report lags. Prior Studies provide evidences that an auditor has weaker bargaining power when facing a client with controlling shareholders than a client that is a widely held firm. Therefore, we hypothesize that family control firms have longer financial report lag than firms without ultimate owners. The results are as follows：1. The firms that change their CPA firm or CPA have longer financial report lags; 2. Family control firms have longer financial report lag than firms without ultimate owners.