The Impacts of Corporate Performance and Agency Problem on Announcement Effect of Outside Directors & Auditors

• Main Authors: Yun-Lin Yu, 游昀玲
• Other Authors: none
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2004
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57696586610785122432

碩士 === 朝陽科技大學 === 財務金融系碩士班 === 92 === 　　Corporate governance is becoming a central issue in Taiwan, and companies hope to enhance their corporate value and stockholder’s wealth through a sounder governance mechanism. 　　We examine the announcement effect of outside directors and /or auditors on stockholder’s wealth. In addition, we explore the impacts of corporate performance and agency problem on announcement effect. The samples of our study contain 58 events during the period 1999/1/1-2003/6/30. The empirical results can be summarized as follows: 　1.Companies experience a significantly positive abnormalreturn while the recruiting of outside directors　and/or auditors is announced. 2.Firms with poorer prior performance, higher free cash flow or information asymmetry would be associated with better announcement effect。 　3.Firms with a duality of CEO and board chair or a weaker board structure before the announcement would have a higher abnormal return. 　4.Companies have higher returns when they have poorer prior performance accompanied with severer agency problem.