IPO Anomalies and Ownership Structure

碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 92 === The primary of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership structure and new issuing firm to underprice their stock, short-run behavior and honeymoon during initial public offerings(IPOs) date.Traditionally, the underpricing of a new stock was view...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hsiang-Ping Tseng, 曾享平
Other Authors: Shou-Min Tsao
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2004
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/yc2592
Description
Summary:碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 92 === The primary of this paper is to explore the association between the ownership structure and new issuing firm to underprice their stock, short-run behavior and honeymoon during initial public offerings(IPOs) date.Traditionally, the underpricing of a new stock was viewed as the consequence of both asymmetric information and inaccurate signaling in the general stock market. However, in this study, the corporate governance is postulated as the primary determinant of the productivity and valuation of all corporations. Under this proposition, we predict the valuation of a firm will significantly increase under better corporate governance because of its positive impact on more incentive effects in practice for managerial personnel, more earnings information available for the public, more accurate financial statements for credible dissemination, and maximal elimination of entrenchment effects in organizational functions. Therefore, during the initial public offerings period, a well structured and governed firm is in a better position to negotiate prices with all business counterparts. And after IPOs, the firm will continue its productivity and valuation. It will thus have higher initial returns and enjoy a longer honeymoon period. Further, following La Porta (2002) for this study, the corporate governance is measured by the divergence between the control rights (vote rights) and cash rights among the controlling shareholders. Basically, a small divergence would indicate a better corporate governance that would, in turn, lead to a higher offering price. Further, the concept of price multiple, proposed by Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2002) is also included for indexing the corporate governance. In empirical assessment, some similar IPO firms were sampled from the TSC or OTC Taiwan。These firms are comparable in size (total assets value) and products and all exceed one-year after the initial offering. For each studied IPO firm, a price-to-value (P/V) ratio was computed where P represents the offer price and V represents the fair value that was based on comparable firm’s market multiples in reference to the closing price of the day before the issuing date. The quantitative indices of all sampled firms were analyzed statistically, first by pairwise t-comparisons, and later by multiple regressions. The major significant findings supported the general research prediction. That is, companies with better corporate governance would result in the higher offered prices, the higher initial returns, and the longer honeymoon duration.