| Summary: | 碩士 === 東海大學 === 企業管理學系碩士班 === 91 === During 1990s, the numbers of firms repurchasing stock, as well as the dollars spent on repurchases, increased drastically. Because SEC just claim the firms to precommit the numbers of open-market repurchase and the range of repurchasing price, manager don’t need to actually repurchase the number of stock as many as the announced target. From the price reaction of stock repurchase announcement, the firms with higher expected stock repurchase will not only get more announced effect, but the numbers of stock purchase announcement are also negatively related to the performance of the firm’s stock in the prior year. By obversing the situation of stock repurchase after stock repurchase announcement, we find firms on average acquire 74 to 83 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement.
As a result, this study hope to know how many shares are actually acquired subsequent to an open-market repurchase program announcement . After considering the goal of stock repurchase, the information between manager and investor, and the self-benefit incentive of the manager this study also want to understand what extent firms exploit the flexibility inherent in these programs are empirical issues.
This study’s samples use the firms listed in the S&P1500 to analyze the determined factors that effect the numbers of actually stock repurchase firstly, further investigating that the rate of stock repurchase achievement and the numbers of stock option effect the level of earning management. In the actually stock repurchase, the results show：（1）underestimated price is positively related to actually stock repurchase（2）debt rate is negatively related to actually stock repurchase（3）cash dividend in the prior year is positively related to actually stock repurchase（4）outstanding stock option in the later year is positively related to actually stock repurchase（5）free cash is positively related to actually stock repurchase（6）the growth opportunity is negatively related to actually stock repurchase. In the numbers of stock option, this results show：（1）earning management is negatively related to the rate of stock repurchase achievement（2）the stock option held by the firm’s manager in the later year is positively related to the rate of stock repurchase achievement.
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