A Research on Taipei City Government's Legislative-Executive Liaison Mechanism:From Perspective of Legislative-Executive Information Transactions

• Main Authors: Cheng-wei Kuo, 郭政瑋
• Other Authors: Don-yun Chen
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2003
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/91398895534644424404

碩士 === 世新大學 === 行政管理學研究所(含博、碩專班) === 91 === The party turn-over in Taipei City Government (TCG) has two times in 1994 and 1998. However, there have been great political disturbances in the executive-legislative relations since then. To reduce this conflict, there is the legislative liaison mechanism in TCG. In this study, author tries to use new institutionalism and boundary-spanning management to explore the function and structure of the legislative liaison mechanism. Author in this study utilizes a in-depth interviewing method to uncover the legislative liaison activities in the TCG. There are three major findings in this research. First, there are four major activities for liaison officers. They are (1) offering written materials about any aspect of TCG’s governing activities, (2) helping legislators to resolve their constituent “caseworks,” (3) handling scheduling and lobbying on department’s budgets and acts, and (4) detecting in advance and responding to the contents of legislators’ interpellation. Second, what liaison officers mainly do is to balance the control costs of the executive branch and the bargaining costs of the legislative branch to “lubricate” the executive-legislative relations. Lastly, one of the purposes of dividing executive and legislative function is to offer general public a cheaper source of information on public affairs. As a result, the transparency of the mechanism is the key to prevent the mechanism from “running too well” to become an “executive-legislative black-box.