An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones

碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 建築及都市計畫研究所 === 91 === Instead of physical capital and labor, intangible input, such as technical know-how, has become the basis of economic growth for the emerging of knowledge-based economies. Re-construction of high technology and traditional industries has been the major task fo...

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Main Authors: HUNG-SHENG LI, 李宏昇
Other Authors: YUAN-XING LIN
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2003
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73323671597527514347
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spelling ndltd-TW-091PCCU02240082015-10-13T13:35:28Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73323671597527514347 An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones 傳統工業區提昇競爭優勢策略之賽局分析--以寡占競爭廠商最適環境成本投入為例-- HUNG-SHENG LI 李宏昇 碩士 中國文化大學 建築及都市計畫研究所 91 Instead of physical capital and labor, intangible input, such as technical know-how, has become the basis of economic growth for the emerging of knowledge-based economies. Re-construction of high technology and traditional industries has been the major task for most countries. In the past, the government-led policy has been the major factor of Taiwan’s economic miracle. However, most industries have faced the challenge of upgrading technology in order to improre the out put capacity of the production environment. Through the application of the input-output analysis, this thesis suggests that as the quantitative limit of the industrial zone has been reached, emphasis should be placed on improring the quality of the production environment in industrial zones. This thesis employs game theory to analyze the competitiveness of the industrial zones. Both Nash and Stackelberg’s theories of equilibria and analyzed and compared to ascertain how firms in a particular industrial zone may maximize profitabi profitability while minimizing expenditure. The result shows that Stackelberg’s equilibrium value isn’t lower than Nash’s equilibrium value. Besides, as the competitiveness of industrial zones increases, Nash’s equilibrium value isn’t necessary higher than Stackelberg’s equilibrium value if the maximum production environment demand that the industrial zone provides to the firms is decided. By comparing the results from Nash’s and Stackelberg’s equilibrium, the firm’s production environment cost can be assessed. Through examining the supply and demand and environment cost, the equilibrium between the types of environment demand and environment cost in industrial zones can be obtained. The findings suggest that either the supply of environment cost, based on Nash’s or , based on Stackelberg’s will be the function of the probability of the environment demand in industrial zones. The findings of this thesis will establish a bench mark for other industrial zones to improve in quality in order to enhance their firms’ competitiveness. YUAN-XING LIN 林元興 2003 學位論文 ; thesis 93 zh-TW
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language zh-TW
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description 碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 建築及都市計畫研究所 === 91 === Instead of physical capital and labor, intangible input, such as technical know-how, has become the basis of economic growth for the emerging of knowledge-based economies. Re-construction of high technology and traditional industries has been the major task for most countries. In the past, the government-led policy has been the major factor of Taiwan’s economic miracle. However, most industries have faced the challenge of upgrading technology in order to improre the out put capacity of the production environment. Through the application of the input-output analysis, this thesis suggests that as the quantitative limit of the industrial zone has been reached, emphasis should be placed on improring the quality of the production environment in industrial zones. This thesis employs game theory to analyze the competitiveness of the industrial zones. Both Nash and Stackelberg’s theories of equilibria and analyzed and compared to ascertain how firms in a particular industrial zone may maximize profitabi profitability while minimizing expenditure. The result shows that Stackelberg’s equilibrium value isn’t lower than Nash’s equilibrium value. Besides, as the competitiveness of industrial zones increases, Nash’s equilibrium value isn’t necessary higher than Stackelberg’s equilibrium value if the maximum production environment demand that the industrial zone provides to the firms is decided. By comparing the results from Nash’s and Stackelberg’s equilibrium, the firm’s production environment cost can be assessed. Through examining the supply and demand and environment cost, the equilibrium between the types of environment demand and environment cost in industrial zones can be obtained. The findings suggest that either the supply of environment cost, based on Nash’s or , based on Stackelberg’s will be the function of the probability of the environment demand in industrial zones. The findings of this thesis will establish a bench mark for other industrial zones to improve in quality in order to enhance their firms’ competitiveness.
author2 YUAN-XING LIN
author_facet YUAN-XING LIN
HUNG-SHENG LI
李宏昇
author HUNG-SHENG LI
李宏昇
spellingShingle HUNG-SHENG LI
李宏昇
An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
author_sort HUNG-SHENG LI
title An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
title_short An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
title_full An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
title_fullStr An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
title_full_unstemmed An Application of Game Theory to Strategies of Competitive Advantages for Traditional Industrial Zones
title_sort application of game theory to strategies of competitive advantages for traditional industrial zones
publishDate 2003
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/73323671597527514347
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