The Study of Applying Performance Bond System to Hazardous Waste Management

• Main Authors: Yeh, Chi-Kai, 葉繼開
• Other Authors: Shaw, Daigee
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2003
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/31198624355865713982

碩士 === 國立臺北大學 === 資源管理研究所碩士在職專班 === 91 === Hazardous waste poses great potential risk to human health and natural environment if it is not treated properly. When the environment is polluted by the hazardous waste, the people who live adjacent to the contaminated site are constantly under the threat of being ill due to its persistence and accumulative effect of toxicity and its uncertainty of the risk. Therefore, it is essential that hazardous waste was treated properly. There are several approaches which government could use to ensure hazardous waste was treated properly. Currently, the major approach is the command and control approach which includes facility standard, register and permit system, and manifest system as promulgated by the Waste Disposal Act. Nevertheless, this management approach still can not ensure that the hazardous waste is properly treated due to the lack of incentives for firms to do it well and the problem of asymmetric information. The performance bond system is proposed to provide the firms with needed incentives to treat the hazardous waste properly. As long as the deposit collected in advance is larger than the cost of treating hazardous waste, it will ensure the effectiveness of the system. Furthermore, the performance bond system would also provide incentives to the environmental authorities to inspect and monitor more aggressively. Also, it is important to include both the firm-participatory supervision mechanism and the open information mechanism in the operation of the performance bond system. Those two mechanisms would encourage the firms and the environmental authorities to perform their duties effectively and efficiently. It would solve the problem of asymmetric information and the accompanying problems of “adverse selection” and “moral hazard”.