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碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 環境政策研究所 === 91 === Abstract After several years’ protest experiences and the final failure on mediation in a case named with “Chao Feng Farm Water Route and Path Mergence”, motivated the researcher to study the methods of Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution (EADR). The r...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Terry Lee, 李旭寧
Other Authors: Mi-Hwong Liang
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2003
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52077137590377578050
Description
Summary:碩士 === 國立東華大學 === 環境政策研究所 === 91 === Abstract After several years’ protest experiences and the final failure on mediation in a case named with “Chao Feng Farm Water Route and Path Mergence”, motivated the researcher to study the methods of Environmental Alternative Dispute Resolution (EADR). The researcher has participated lots of environmental disputes in Hualien from 1998 to 2001. During the mediation case, although the researcher attempted to lead both sides into negotiation process, but the effort was still fail after one year. What this study attempted to explore was that lots of environmental arguments, no matter its scale, hearsay definitely had the requirements of environmental dispute solution institution. But why the national mechanisms such as “mediation-arbitration system” and “environmental protection agreement” still couldn’t produce anticipate function? This study based on the theory of “New Institutionalism”, adopted the “Historical─ Structural Approach” and referred to development procedure of the environmental dispute resolution generated from both U.S.A. and Japan .It defined the elements which might affect the growth and development of the institution, such as: (1) the failure of government to satisfy the society with resolving environmental disputes efficiently , (2) the delay of the national legislation over environmental dispute resolution which stimulated the creation local mechanism to deal with environmental disputes, (3) the potential of applications are widespread, (4) the availability of healthy and credibility third party, and their aggressively interference which led to the sequential development of alternatives, (5) the social culture behind the scene, (6) the demonstrational effect of successful cases. This study used relevant statistics to disclose the unsuccessful facts of country’s Public Nuisance Disputes Mediation Act. By comparing with the successful factors found in U.S.A. and Japan, the researcher concluded that the causes of failure of our country can be classified into below four categories: (1) the competition between and substitution by the Environmental Impact Assessment Act (2) the inseparable greedy request on compensation fees from the victims, frighten the industries to become absent, (3) the preempt of the pollution-control laws and the limitation on “environmental protection agreement”, (4) the lack of the participation of the civil organization, local government and agents. Besides, according to the quality, it could be divided further into (1) the competition of other formal institutions, ex. “The Environmental Impact Assessment Act” and other pollution-control regulation laws, (2) the competition of informal institutions and the claim for compensation, (3) the dissonance of environmental conditions caused by divergent of interest groups and the fragileness of trust toward local governments. In summary, this study suggested the key decision makers, including the department of execution, the department of legislative and relevant civil organizations) should adjust the attitude of governance and “centralism” and gradually progress from “dominated by single party ” to “thinking with bi-parties or multiple sides” to allow the participation of the civilians, and to built up the mutual-support relationship between the public and private sectors. Besides, this study recommends several concrete methods for improving these environmental dispute resolution systems. These are: (1) increasing the enticements of the system and reducing the competition power of other institutions, (2) creating a model case and enhancing the learning effect, (3) solving problem is not the first priority of the institution design, (4) loosening the existing laws, and (5) promoting and establishing more new civil organizations. In short, only if the formal institution, informal institutions and surrounding environment conditions were considered together, then we could construct out an enticements structure which could change public behaviors. In that case, the environmental dispute resolution system might produce anticipated remarkable effect.