Applying Reputation Mechanisms in the Iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma.

• Main Authors: Ying-Jiun Jeng, 鄭穎駿
• Other Authors: Chuen-Tsai Sun
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2003
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/21140047330572416077

碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 資訊科學系 === 91 === Going along with the prosperity of the Internet, there are more and more people interacting with each other through the Internet. And there are also more and more companies running business on the Internet. But because of the characteristics of the Internet, such as cross-territory and anonymity , both sides of the trading are at the risk of being cheated by their counterpart. So finding a way to preventing cheating behavior and promoting the cooperation of the trading parties is an important issue. In E-Commerce, the trading parties will interact with each other constantly to increase their own profit. They might cooperate with each other to reciprocate in the long run. But on the other hand, they might also want to exploit others to gain bigger short-term profit. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a social model that captures the core of the above situation. The Prisoner’s Dilemma and its applications have been described in many domains including biology, economics, and political sciences. Therefore, it is a very suitable model to study computer agent-based cooperation. A good reputation estimation mechanism provides an effective way to promote cooperation. Reputation can be considered as an estimation of others’ behavior or will, and is thus an important reference for choosing partners. In fact, reputation is a complex social concept, and can be distinguished into many types. Moreover, using reputation can lead to a new problem of faking. In our research, we will use computer simulation to study reputation-related topics in the convention of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. And we hope our research will improve our understanding of applying reputation in the cyberspace to encourage virtual cooperation.