| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 土木工程系 === 91 === Land grant is a common policy tool which can used to capture external benefits for privatized infrastructure projects. To capture the benefits, concessionaires usually need to make additional investment. The decision to invest is influenced by such factors as net proceeds from related property development, risks involved, and the way how the projects are financed.
In this study, Game theory is used to analyze concessionaires’ investment behavior under non-recourse project financing arrangements, The study finds that BOT investors tend to over-invest under non-recourse arrangements. The tendency is influenced by how the net proceeds from land-grants related investment is shore and the level of concessionaires‘ equity commitments. To avoid moral hazards of the concessionaires, financiers may reduce the amount of debts and thus increase the concessionaires’ capital commitments. The financiers may also ehannel additional resources to monitor the projects more closely.
This study uses those finding to trace the early development of Taiwan’s north-south high-speed rail project. The concludes land grants as a policy tool for privatized infrastructure projects can be further understood by game-theoretical analyses. A better understanding insures how the tool could be used in a more effective manner.
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