An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure
碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 91 === This study analyzes a hierarchical structure, comparing to typical analytical literature of management accounting, which is structured on single layer. Basically the hierarchical structure is composed of three main game players, Owner, Manager and Worker, and the eco...
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ndltd-TW-091CYCU53850132015-10-13T16:56:50Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51366288024852722384 An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure 多層級組織下責任會計之分析性研究 Chen-Chin Wang 王貞靜 碩士 中原大學 會計研究所 91 This study analyzes a hierarchical structure, comparing to typical analytical literature of management accounting, which is structured on single layer. Basically the hierarchical structure is composed of three main game players, Owner, Manager and Worker, and the economic behaviors of their decision-making are as follow, (1) Owner, the principal, is in charge of the design of firm’s responsibility center, and the best compensation plan of manager’s incentive mechanism based on different responsibility centers. (2) Manager, one of the agents, is responsible for capacity planning and incentive programming to make his worker pursue optimal throughputs spontaneously, and decides how much effort he needs to contribute to production efficiency improving. (3) Worker, the other agent, decides how much effort he would like to input. Through this model simulation concludes that:First, the owner should use dual performance index to develop incentive mechanism for his manager, when the uncertainty of throughput is going up or the risk-averse coefficient of agents, manager and worker, grows especially. Second, there will be no significant difference frousing dual or single performance index when the uncertainty of throughput is going down or the risk-averse coefficient of agents decreases. Finally, what capacity planning and the optimal incentive-programming manager plan to develop, and how much effort worker would like to input, will be influenced by the three key factors:the uncertainty of throughput and the risk-averse coefficient of agents accordingly. Wu-Chun Chi Ju-Yang Jian 戚務君 簡俱揚 2003 學位論文 ; thesis 43 zh-TW |
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碩士 === 中原大學 === 會計研究所 === 91 === This study analyzes a hierarchical structure, comparing to typical analytical literature of management accounting, which is structured on single layer. Basically the hierarchical structure is composed of three main game players, Owner, Manager and Worker, and the economic behaviors of their decision-making are as follow, (1) Owner, the principal, is in charge of the design of firm’s responsibility center, and the best compensation plan of manager’s incentive mechanism based on different responsibility centers. (2) Manager, one of the agents, is responsible for capacity planning and incentive programming to make his worker pursue optimal throughputs spontaneously, and decides how much effort he needs to contribute to production efficiency improving. (3) Worker, the other agent, decides how much effort he would like to input.
Through this model simulation concludes that:First, the owner should use dual performance index to develop incentive mechanism for his manager, when the uncertainty of throughput is going up or the risk-averse coefficient of agents, manager and worker, grows especially. Second, there will be no significant difference frousing dual or single performance index when the uncertainty of throughput is going down or the risk-averse coefficient of agents decreases. Finally, what capacity planning and the optimal incentive-programming manager plan to develop, and how much effort worker would like to input, will be influenced by the three key factors:the uncertainty of throughput and the risk-averse coefficient of agents accordingly.
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author2 |
Wu-Chun Chi |
author_facet |
Wu-Chun Chi Chen-Chin Wang 王貞靜 |
author |
Chen-Chin Wang 王貞靜 |
spellingShingle |
Chen-Chin Wang 王貞靜 An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
author_sort |
Chen-Chin Wang |
title |
An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
title_short |
An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
title_full |
An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
title_fullStr |
An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
title_full_unstemmed |
An Analytical Study of Responsibility Accounting in a Hierarchical Structure |
title_sort |
analytical study of responsibility accounting in a hierarchical structure |
publishDate |
2003 |
url |
http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/51366288024852722384 |
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