Information-Signaling and Competitive Effects of the Establishment of the Financial Holding Company in Taiwan .

碩士 === 真理大學 === 管理科學研究所 === 91 === Title of Thesis:Information-Signaling and Competitive Effects of Establish--ment of the Financial Holding Company in Taiwan.Key words:Financial Holding Company; Event study method; Rivals; Information-signaling effects; Competitive effects.Name of Institute:Graduat...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Sue-Mei Ho, 何淑媚
Other Authors: Wen-Wu Chang
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2003
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/71200385604041103994
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Summary:碩士 === 真理大學 === 管理科學研究所 === 91 === Title of Thesis:Information-Signaling and Competitive Effects of Establish--ment of the Financial Holding Company in Taiwan.Key words:Financial Holding Company; Event study method; Rivals; Information-signaling effects; Competitive effects.Name of Institute:Graduate Institute of Management Sciences, Aletheia Graduate Date:June, 2003 Degree Conferred:MasterName of Student:Shu-Mei Ho Advisor:Wen-Wu Chang 何淑媚 張文武Abstract: 「Cross-selling」is the trend of the worldwide financial markets. Due to overly competitive and following the deregulation and internationalization of the worldwide financial. We passed “the Law of Bank Holding Company” in June 27, 2001. This research uses the Event Study method, three event announcements and three days cumulative average abnormal returns explores whether the finance market is in response to establishment of the Financial Holding announcements. Does the rivals to conform to the information-signaling hypothesis or competitive hypothesis?. For first announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive standardized cumulative average abnormal returns but insignificancy. For rivals, banks, insurance have insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. Security and facility have positive and significant cumulative average abnormal returns, which support the information-signaling hypothesis. For second announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive significant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. For rivals, banks, security, facility have insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. Insurance have negative insignificant cumulative average abnormal returns. For third announcement, that the empirical results imply Financial Holding Company have positive significant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns. For rivals, banks have negative significant cumulative average abnormal returns, which support the competitive hypothesis. The security, insurance, facility have positive insignificant standardized cumulative average abnormal returns.