The Relation Between the Ownership Structure and the Debt structure

• Main Author: 劉淑真
• Other Authors: 夏侯欣榮
• Format: Others
• Language: en_US
• Published: 2002
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19147396284569276843

碩士 === 元智大學 === 財務金融研究所 === 90 === This paper studies agency problems of debt to see the relation between the debt structure and the ownership structure. I find that the concentration of share-ownership and different types of ownership will influence debt structure. Rather than immediate ownership, I also use the ultimate control to examine the effect of separation of ownership and control on firm’s debt structure. My main finding is that the asset substitution problem is more pronounced for firms with high concentration of share-ownership, and hence public debt is predicted to borrow to avoid delegating costly monitoring to a bank. The monitor activities of institutional holding will reduce agency costs associated with debt, and firms have an incentive to borrow longer-term debt. Conversely, firms with more individual holding tend to borrow shorter-term debt. The association between corporate holding and the debt maturity preferences is weak.