Reputation, Information Ambiguity, and Herding Behavior

• Main Authors: Chen Ben Yu, 陳炳宇
• Other Authors: Chun-An Li
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2002
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/76377022375395052481

碩士 === 國立雲林科技大學 === 財務金融系 === 90 === The issue of the relationships between information ambiguity and herding behavior is overlooked and doesn''t has been analyzed and verified in the related herding literature. For exam this intriguing issue, we mold the concept of information ambiguity into the model based on the consideration on reputation and compensation. We find, no matter how the private information is different among the decision-makers, there exists a perfect Bayesian herding equilibrium when the compensation offer to the only one success is not high enough. However, the herding behavior is more possible when decision-makers all observed same information. Under the situation where decision-makers all observed same information, we find that more precise the information, more possible the behavior of reputational herding. But contrary to this argument, we find that when the private information observed by the decision-makers are different, the degree of information ambiguity does not affect decision-makers’ decisions, in another word, the behavior of reputational herding is not influenced by information ambiguity