A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941

碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所 === 90 === Nazi German Armed Forces on June 22, 1941, according to Hitler’s no.21 mandate, went on Barbarossa Operation, this action ushered in the invading of Russia. When Hitler launched a campaign against Russia, he believed that German Armed Force...

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Main Authors: WeiChaou Wang, 王威超
Other Authors: Kung Ling Sheng
Format: Others
Language:zh-TW
Published: 2002
Online Access:http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06798645944824629591
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description 碩士 === 淡江大學 === 國際事務與戰略研究所 === 90 === Nazi German Armed Forces on June 22, 1941, according to Hitler’s no.21 mandate, went on Barbarossa Operation, this action ushered in the invading of Russia. When Hitler launched a campaign against Russia, he believed that German Armed Forces had the capability of defeating Russia before the end of 1941. So long as this objective could be attained, they could ensure the German Armed Forces safety in the rear headquaters and they also could counterattack Britain and allied nations to get a victory. As the stronger German Armed Forces blockaded the European Continental Sea, the more important Russia’s richest resources were to the German industry. Similarly, Russia’s grain production also was very important to Germany. The thought difference between the two nations caused Hitler to feel that sooner or later, there would be a great deal of conflict between them, so he decided by himself to launch an attack against Russia. Between the two World Wars, Germany and Russia signed the Non-aggression Treaty. This movement made Russia decrease their fear that German Armed Forces would invade them soon and didn’t give any reasons for Stalin to give up the determination that Russia would get along with Germany peacefully, or the determination to brave the danger of launching an invading war against Germany. At the time, the German Armed Forces already were the undisputed world power, if Stalin launched an attack against Germany rashly, he might be defeated. On the other hand, Russia was forced to take notice of the German troops that were moving to the East. Stalin was preparing by exerting his utmost strength to strengthen his defense capabilities, but the initiative was controlled by Hitler. Stalin felt, at that moment, he could at least brave the danger of launching a two-proged war. Because he gained a victory by defeating France from west battle line, he knew that the German Army had rich experiences in lightning war, he felt they could destroy the military forces of the Bolshevik Regime within 1941. He issued orders that at the end of the muddy spring weather, about in May, would be the earliest date to launch an attack. Beyond his expectation, the Balkan Battle had been delayed for 5-6 months, because German machnized troops which gained a victory in Balkan Peninsula, had to be recalled back for replenishment and reorganization. At that moment, Hitler had allied himself to three Axis Powers-Finland, Hungary and Romania. Althrough Italy was one of Germany’s Axis Powers, at that time it would not act as an essential role in conquering Russia. Because Italy was caught in the North Africa battle field, it not only could not dispatch army forces to support Germany, but also had to depend upon Germany’s support to stabilize their combat success. On April 13, 1941, Japan and Russia signed a treaty of Neutrality. This action not only destroyed the Far East military balance, but it also gave Hitler a chance to move some armed forces back to Europe.If Japan could avoid pinning down by Russia and attack Singapore promptly, Japan could be pinned down by British troops in Singapore which was advantageous to Hitler. While Hitler explained why he must go on the conquering of Russia action to German people, he especially stressed the threat of Bolshevizm and pointed out that it was great opportunity for them to get rid of threat once and for all. He said:”Our German historical mission is to rescue Western Civilization and remove the threat of Communism.” German people felt they would need to undertake a great sacrifice, but did not understand the degree of war that would develop. Regarding the war on Russia, the supreme commander of German Forces had issued an order- “ The style of battle is to wipe out all of the Russia Army Forces which station on the west territory and use the Armoured Cavalry Forces to march forward to Russia territory so they can defense in depth and deter the routed troops of Russia to retreat to the vast inner territory.” According to Hitler’s decree on December 18, 1940, the attacking target of German Armed Forces was along the Archangel River and Volga River to separate the Russia territory into Europe Soviet and Asia Soviet. Germany supposted that Russia might use the finished field operation fortress which located on the new and old national border line (part fortification had been strengthened in 1941). They also could use the water channel and rivers for moving carefully every step of the way to avoid the decisive battle in the west side of Dnieper and Dvina Rivers with Germany. At the same time, they thought the Russian Forces would especially emphasize the air and sea bases which were in the Baltic Sea area to hold fast to the Black Sea bank. Russia might use their powerful army to deferd between the south and north side of Russisa. Once the battle condition was not advantageous to Russia along the south and north Pripet Marshes, they might also use Armoured Cavalry to block German Forces moving toward Dniper River and Dvina River battle lines. German Army Headquaters according to the order issued from the German National Defence Troop’s chief commander’s brief, drafted a battle plan which set up the first target. They were to use the Armoured Cavalry to penetrate into the north and south Pripet Marshes area and break through Russian Forces that had been already been separated. Hitler not only ignored the Russian people’s natural instincts- tough and tensile, low desire for goals and materials, resistable and indomitable spirit, but be also under estimated the combat power of Russia, neglected the bad terrain and the bitter cold weather of Russia to hindered material supply to their forces. In the end, these oversights the failure of the Barbarossa Operation. From the Barbarossa Operation, causes us to study and estimate some fresh questions caused by Hitler fighting against Russia. They might include these problems-attacking from both sides, armoured cavalry marching toward the enemy’s base, rear supply from its own force, commanding the country’s armed forces, and how to decree the fighting determination that would cause for common people to think deeply and inexhaustibly.
author2 Kung Ling Sheng
author_facet Kung Ling Sheng
WeiChaou Wang
王威超
author WeiChaou Wang
王威超
spellingShingle WeiChaou Wang
王威超
A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
author_sort WeiChaou Wang
title A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
title_short A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
title_full A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
title_fullStr A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
title_full_unstemmed A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941
title_sort study on german barbarossa operation in 1941
publishDate 2002
url http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06798645944824629591
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spelling ndltd-TW-090TKU003220252016-06-24T04:14:53Z http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/06798645944824629591 A Study on German Barbarossa Operation in 1941 德國1941年巴巴羅莎作戰之研究 WeiChaou Wang 王威超 碩士 淡江大學 國際事務與戰略研究所 90 Nazi German Armed Forces on June 22, 1941, according to Hitler’s no.21 mandate, went on Barbarossa Operation, this action ushered in the invading of Russia. When Hitler launched a campaign against Russia, he believed that German Armed Forces had the capability of defeating Russia before the end of 1941. So long as this objective could be attained, they could ensure the German Armed Forces safety in the rear headquaters and they also could counterattack Britain and allied nations to get a victory. As the stronger German Armed Forces blockaded the European Continental Sea, the more important Russia’s richest resources were to the German industry. Similarly, Russia’s grain production also was very important to Germany. The thought difference between the two nations caused Hitler to feel that sooner or later, there would be a great deal of conflict between them, so he decided by himself to launch an attack against Russia. Between the two World Wars, Germany and Russia signed the Non-aggression Treaty. This movement made Russia decrease their fear that German Armed Forces would invade them soon and didn’t give any reasons for Stalin to give up the determination that Russia would get along with Germany peacefully, or the determination to brave the danger of launching an invading war against Germany. At the time, the German Armed Forces already were the undisputed world power, if Stalin launched an attack against Germany rashly, he might be defeated. On the other hand, Russia was forced to take notice of the German troops that were moving to the East. Stalin was preparing by exerting his utmost strength to strengthen his defense capabilities, but the initiative was controlled by Hitler. Stalin felt, at that moment, he could at least brave the danger of launching a two-proged war. Because he gained a victory by defeating France from west battle line, he knew that the German Army had rich experiences in lightning war, he felt they could destroy the military forces of the Bolshevik Regime within 1941. He issued orders that at the end of the muddy spring weather, about in May, would be the earliest date to launch an attack. Beyond his expectation, the Balkan Battle had been delayed for 5-6 months, because German machnized troops which gained a victory in Balkan Peninsula, had to be recalled back for replenishment and reorganization. At that moment, Hitler had allied himself to three Axis Powers-Finland, Hungary and Romania. Althrough Italy was one of Germany’s Axis Powers, at that time it would not act as an essential role in conquering Russia. Because Italy was caught in the North Africa battle field, it not only could not dispatch army forces to support Germany, but also had to depend upon Germany’s support to stabilize their combat success. On April 13, 1941, Japan and Russia signed a treaty of Neutrality. This action not only destroyed the Far East military balance, but it also gave Hitler a chance to move some armed forces back to Europe.If Japan could avoid pinning down by Russia and attack Singapore promptly, Japan could be pinned down by British troops in Singapore which was advantageous to Hitler. While Hitler explained why he must go on the conquering of Russia action to German people, he especially stressed the threat of Bolshevizm and pointed out that it was great opportunity for them to get rid of threat once and for all. He said:”Our German historical mission is to rescue Western Civilization and remove the threat of Communism.” German people felt they would need to undertake a great sacrifice, but did not understand the degree of war that would develop. Regarding the war on Russia, the supreme commander of German Forces had issued an order- “ The style of battle is to wipe out all of the Russia Army Forces which station on the west territory and use the Armoured Cavalry Forces to march forward to Russia territory so they can defense in depth and deter the routed troops of Russia to retreat to the vast inner territory.” According to Hitler’s decree on December 18, 1940, the attacking target of German Armed Forces was along the Archangel River and Volga River to separate the Russia territory into Europe Soviet and Asia Soviet. Germany supposted that Russia might use the finished field operation fortress which located on the new and old national border line (part fortification had been strengthened in 1941). They also could use the water channel and rivers for moving carefully every step of the way to avoid the decisive battle in the west side of Dnieper and Dvina Rivers with Germany. At the same time, they thought the Russian Forces would especially emphasize the air and sea bases which were in the Baltic Sea area to hold fast to the Black Sea bank. Russia might use their powerful army to deferd between the south and north side of Russisa. Once the battle condition was not advantageous to Russia along the south and north Pripet Marshes, they might also use Armoured Cavalry to block German Forces moving toward Dniper River and Dvina River battle lines. German Army Headquaters according to the order issued from the German National Defence Troop’s chief commander’s brief, drafted a battle plan which set up the first target. They were to use the Armoured Cavalry to penetrate into the north and south Pripet Marshes area and break through Russian Forces that had been already been separated. Hitler not only ignored the Russian people’s natural instincts- tough and tensile, low desire for goals and materials, resistable and indomitable spirit, but be also under estimated the combat power of Russia, neglected the bad terrain and the bitter cold weather of Russia to hindered material supply to their forces. In the end, these oversights the failure of the Barbarossa Operation. From the Barbarossa Operation, causes us to study and estimate some fresh questions caused by Hitler fighting against Russia. They might include these problems-attacking from both sides, armoured cavalry marching toward the enemy’s base, rear supply from its own force, commanding the country’s armed forces, and how to decree the fighting determination that would cause for common people to think deeply and inexhaustibly. Kung Ling Sheng 孔令晟 2002 學位論文 ; thesis 171 zh-TW