Explaining PNTR for China: Two-Level Game Politics after Tiananman Incident

• Main Author: 黃憲一
• Other Authors: 魏萼
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2002
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/25739232235010519511

博士 === 淡江大學 === 美國研究所 === 90 === Expanding trade was one of Clinton’s three main goals during his eight years’ presidency, while his China policy was the key element of this goal, of which the central issues were the hottest debates and fights in the whole decision-making process including each year’s MFN status giving after Tiananman incident, WTO access agreement’s negotiation, and Congressional approval of PNTR for China. Logically these issues should concern only economic welfares of the people in both countries, but practically economic welfares became the least concern. Thus, a lot of paradoxes or puzzles are revealed, while the prevailing ideas of trade politics could not provide a satisfactory explanation. Therefore, it is the purpose of this study to search for a way to solve that. This study utilized the eclectic research framework integrating model-building and case study logics with the art of political analysis methodology, constantly going back and forth between historical description and reviewing analysis with continuing dialogue between theoretical and empirical studies, for the purpose of fulfilling two objectives of this study: on the one hand, systematically explaining the details of this whole decision-making process; on the other hand, trying to build and verify a conceptual model for understanding the general decision-making process of American trade policies. Consequently, this study first began with the studies of similar works on decision-making process of key trade laws and agreements and found explanations inadequate; then inevitably went through more fundamental sources of ideas, systematically studying the interactions among trade/political economy theory, decision theory, ideology/attitude, and trade policies; and finally with the help of all these knowledge, presented the conceptual model and tentative hypotheses of this study to fill the remaining explanation gaps. Finally, a thorough empirical study was conducted for the whole decision-making process, reaching the conclusions being able to verify the above tentative hypotheses with only a minor modification, The three major findings are briefed as follows: (1) the essence of American trade policies is dominated by elite factions, while the practice by interest groups and general public, however the symbolic meanings in the minds of grassroots have always grasped central attentions; (2) American trade policies are rooted in third hand/third way; and (3) the genuine decision-making behavior is characterized as “two-level game politics” model, surpassing prevailing “trade politics” model and interacting “ideological politics”, “trade politics”, and “symbolic politics” models. In conclusion, the research findings have verified the main theme of this dissertation: the decision-making process of American trade policy features some unique American styles, such as dynamic consistency, constraining constitutional failure, and “two-level game politics” decision-making under the guidance of third hand/third way.