| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立成功大學 === 政治經濟研究所 === 90 === There are many problems existing in Taiwan’s National Health Insurance Institution, even though the public satisfaction with NHI is going up after implementing it in 1995. For example, the average outpatient visits per enrollee per year is higher than the standard of OECD. etc. In fact, the growth rates of medical expenditure of NHI are higher than the growth rates of revenue of NHI in recent years.
The study focuses on the institutional level and tries to analysis the opportunistic behavior of actress’s actions or interactions under NHI according to New Institutionalism. After analyzing the finical foundations of NHI, we can find the similar behaviors of legislators, which belong to difficult parties under election institution.
There are three findings：（1）The fee-for-service payment system is major causes of rapidly growing medical expenditure of NHI. But, the standard of payment, which is lower than CPI in last 10 to 15 years, makes the opportunistic incentive of medical-service-providers higher. （2）High information cost and doctor’s professional power make the medical resource wasting getting up.（3）Temporary policy adds the complication of problems of NHI.
The bureau that wants to decrease the growth of medical expenditure of NHI should change the system. Second, information technology（IT） can efficiency decrease the opportunistic incentive between patients and medical-service-providers.
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