The effect of asymmetry information on the institution of responsibility accounting

• Main Authors: Men — Hao Ho, 何旻浩
• Other Authors: Shi — Zhong Giu
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2000
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/53049885062538969842

碩士 === 中國文化大學 === 會計研究所 === 89 === ABSTRACT Agency problems are coming with company’s extent expanded, and managers hope the responsibility accounting can solve agency problems. But under the situation of asymmetry information, department leaders usually have more information than managers. The information advance will make department leaders lie about information for maximizing self-utility. Due to the situation of asymmetry information, managers need to control the activities of department leaders by revising contracts with them. If the design of responsibility accounting institution couldn’t consider about the problem of different level of asymmetry information, the effectiveness about responsi-bility accounting system is doubtful. In the premise of self-utility, department leaders or managers will pressure the other one, and affect the maximum of company’s utility. Moral hazard usually happens under the situation of asymmetry information. Contracts must be designed carefully in the beginning, otherwise that couldn’t succeed in the pur-pose of the maximum of company’s utility.