| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立交通大學 === 土木工程系 === 89 === The economic development and the level on quality of life are related to infrastructure project. In recent years, government encountered the challenge of financial retrenchment when execute important infrastructure projects, because of the increasing of regularly expenditure. For resolve this problem, government enthusiastic published private participation in infrastructure investment. Transfer the public property right to private competitive company and induce financial and operating efficiency by concession competitive mechanism of Build-Operate-Transfer model.
It exists a set of problems on concession-contract negotiation phase on executing infrastructure project. These problems include the lack of detail information about project, huge uncertainty influence, the gap of recognition about project’s objective and limitation about negotiating set. These will deep influence the process and outcomes of negotiation by variety of negotiating power, strategies and behavior between disputers. And it is resulting in phenomenon about literal concession and an inferior position on government.
This research will try to capture the concession negotiation process and possible interactive responses of BOT contracting parties in game-theoretic models. Analyzing the influence on process and outcomes of concession-contract negotiation by capture the variability of bargaining power and time preference. The resulting models would enable a better understanding of the NOT concession negotiation process and provide some guidelines for contracting parties.
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