從股權結構與資本市場誘因探析我國銀行業之盈餘管理行為

• Main Author: 莊文源
• Other Authors: 林宛瑩
• Format: Others
• Language: zh-TW
• Published: 2001
• Online Access: http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/17498733826027592638

碩士 === 國立政治大學 === 會計學系 === 89 === Abstract Banking industry in Taiwan is highly regulated and scrutinized by the banking law and government. Regulators of banking industry require that banks must satisfy certain capital adequacy ratio that is explicitly tied to accounting numbers. The regulating bodies have authority in inspecting banks’ businesses and examining their financial reports periodically to evaluate their underlying performance. Based on a cost-benefit consideration and availability of information, the investors also analyze the performance of banks using their public available financial statements. The earnings behavior of firms in the banking industry is therefore essential for both regulators and investors in procuring the knowledge about the operating risk and performance of banking firms. Focused on the firms in the banking industry over the period of 1991 to 1999, this thesis first investigates whether the sample firm is subject to an earnings behavior of delayed recognition of their income and losses. The thesis also examines the influence of ownership structure on banks’ earnings management behavior through the analysis of income manipulation ratios. Furthermore, in view of capital market incentives, this thesis studies whether going listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange would cast impacts on banks’ earnings management behavior as banks are subject to different earnings management objectives (targets). The empirical results document that the fourth quarter ratios of the interim income manipulation items are larger and more variable than those of the other three quarters. This suggests that banks tend to delay their recognition of income manipulation items till the fourth quarter. The empirical findings reveal that the propensity for manipulating the fourth quarter expense/loss items is significantly greater for private banks than for state-owned banks. However, the empirical results cannot support the hypothesis that management ownership (the holdings of the directors and supervisors) will affect the magnitude of earnings management. With respect to capital market incentive issues, the empirical evidence indicates that for newly listed banks, both the two-year average operating income to capital ratio and income before tax to capital ratio before listing reach and not greatly exceed the 10% threshold. The evidence shows that these two ratios decline significantly in the second year after listing. The findings also suggest that listed banks which achieve their financial forecasts tend to recognize more bad debt expenses for the fourth quarter, while the pattern cannot manifest itself in the gain manipulation items. Keyword: earnings management, ownership structure, capital market incentive