| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 歷史研究所 === 89 === China suffered the problems of serious food shortages after the disastrous Great Leap Forward and followed by draught and bad harvest. For Chiang Kai-shek, the mainland’s economic troubles spelled opportunity, perhaps the last chance to fulfill his dream of a triumphal return to the mainland. In 1962, Chiang pressed for U.S. backing for Nationalist airdrops of 200-300 men to stimulate resistance on the mainland. Convinced that operations on that scale would be disastrous, U.S. officials reminded Chiang of his commitment under notes exchange with the Mutual Security Treaty of 1954 not to attack the mainland without U.S. agreement. They hesitated to rebuff Chiang completely, however, fearing he might prepare secretly for an invasion and perhaps even launch a suicidal attack in the expectation of forcing Kennedy’s hand. Kennedy told his advisers he did not want the Nationalists to be able to say that just as they were ready to return to the mainland, the United States “flunked out.” The President temporized, agreeing to small-scale Nationalist probes while persuading Chiang to postpone large-scale airdrops.
In June 1962, an extensive buildup of Communist military forces on the mainland opposite Taiwan revived the problem of the Nationalist-held offshore islands. Kennedy and his advises, uncertain whether the new buildup represented a defensive response to Chiang Kai-shek invasion threats or preparation for an offensive attack on the offshore islands, tried to guard against both contingencies. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs W. Averell Harriman warned Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin on June 22 of possible U.S. intervention in case of an attack on the islands but also told him the United States would not support Chiang in an attack on the mainland. On June 23, Cabot gave Wang Ping-nan the same message Harriman had given to Dobrynin. At a June 27 press conference Kennedy declared that the U.S. position remained what it had been under Eisenhower: the United States would defend the islands if necessary to protect Taiwan.
The PRC buildup ceased and tension eased. Chiang Kai-shek was greatly perturbed, however, by press reports of Cabot’s assurance to Wang and even more unhappy when the new Ambassador, Alan Kirk, delivered a message from Kennedy urging against any action that night offer a pretext for a Community attack. In the next few months, U.S.-ROC relations deteriorated in spite of U.S. acquiescence in a few small-scale mainland raids, all of which failed. U.S. officials continued to temporize on the question of large-scale raids but increasingly doubted the wisdom of equivocation on such a vital issue. U.S. military aid was subjected to more scrutiny. Perhaps most annoying to Chiang, Ambassador Kirk reminded on several occasions of his commitment not to take action against the mainland without U.S. agreement.
When Kirk returned to Washington for surgery in January 1963, he warned the President that despite Chiang’s promise never to attack without U.S. agreement, U.S. officials in Taipei were uneasy at the possibility that he might launch an attack without agreement in order to drag the United States into the conflict. Chiang had stopped seeing Kirk and tried to use personal message to Kennedy through various channels to probe U.S. willingness to give him freedom of action against the mainland. Shortly before Kirk resigned because of illness, he urged Kennedy to make it clear to Chiang that the United States would not countenance a Nationalist attack. Kennedy did so in April 11 letter to Chiang.
The Nationalists scaled down preparations for an invasion although Chiang did not completely give up the idea. In September 1963, Chiang Ching-kuo met with Kennedy and his top advisers in Washington and promoted the idea of guerrilla operations on the mainland. Kennedy doubted that such a campaign could succeed unless the mainland was ready to revolt. Stressing the importance of first obtaining reliable intelligence on mainland resistance, he told Chiang the United States did not want to be involved in operations that were doomed to failure. At the close of the year, Kirk’s successor, Jerauld Wright, reported that there was little evidence that Chiang contemplated “cranking up the military machine for any early large-scale action.”
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