公司監理、產品市場競爭程度與公司績效之關連性研究
碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計學研究所 === 89 === This study investigates whether product market competition can reduce agency costs arising from weaker internal governance structures. We argue that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems. After controlling for standard economic deter...
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| Format: | Others |
| Language: | zh-TW |
| Published: |
2001
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| Online Access: | http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41539135278521599651 |
| Summary: | 碩士 === 國立中正大學 === 會計學研究所 === 89 === This study investigates whether product market competition can reduce agency costs arising from weaker internal governance structures. We argue that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems. After controlling for standard economic determinants of CEO compensation, we find that CEOs earn more excess compensation when internal governance structures are less effective; and that product market competition can reduce this excess compensation. Besides, we also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from the characteristics of internal governance structures has a statistically significant negative relation with subsequent corporate performance; and that the negative relation between the predicted excess compensation and future corporate performance will be attenuated by product market competition. Overall, our results suggest that CEOs at firms with weaker internal governance structures receive greater compensation and perform worse performance; and that product market competition can reduce these agency costs.
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